Research Article

Compensation Incentive of Executives under the Situation of Synergy or Mutual Exclusion of Corporate Profit and Innovation Tasks: Based on Incentive Game Model between Principal and Agent

Table 6

Correlation analysis between profit and innovation tasks (exclusive).

LnpayECSROEμLEVGQPLNBOARDDUALGROWTHRATIO

Lnpay10.2340.1900.0310.1070.0220.071−0.034−0.0190.021
ECS0.24410.1630.039−0.0410.0840.004−0.0250.0190.019
ROE0.0280.0211−0.016−0.1150.2030.052−0.048−0.169−0.010
μ0.0310.039−0.00110.0290.0330.073−0.0500.246−0.031
LEV0.038−0.068−0.0400.03610.0250.153−0.138−0.028−0.023
GQP0.0450.0840.0310.0420.02010.030−0.0700.0150.017
LNBOARD0.0770.022−0.0210.0800.0510.0461−0.2290.003−0.656
DUAL−0.021−0.0280.021−0.041−0.091−0.078−0.22010.0300.108
GROWTH0.004−0.0110.0010.0710.0000.0860.052−0.0151−0.015
RATIO0.0270.0180.016−0.0340.0110.036−0.5670.105−0.0271

Note. : significant at 1% level; : significant at 5% level; : means significant at 10% level. The lower left corner is the Pearson correlation analysis result, and the upper right corner is the Spearman correlation analysis result.