An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships

Table 1

Game payoff matrices in PPPs.

Scenario I: without participation of the general public			Scenario II: with participation of the general public
Private investor	Government		Private investor	Government
	AC (y)	NAC (1 − y)		AC (y)	NAC (1 − y)
PHS (x)	R1 − C	R2 − C	PHS (x)	(R1 − C) (1 + λ)	(R2 − C) (1 + λ)
	G1	G2		G1 (1 + λ)	G2(1 − λ)
PLS (1 − x)	R3	R4	PLS (1 − x)	R3(1 − λ)	R4(1 − λ)
	G3	G4		G3 (1 + λ)	G4(1 − λ)