Supervision Strategy Analysis on Price Discrimination of E-Commerce Company in the Context of Big Data Based on Four-Party Evolutionary Game

Table 1

Parameter description.

Parameter	Description
Pn	The benefit of nondifferential pricing by e-commerce company to consumer
Pd	The benefit of differential pricing by e-commerce company to consumer
∆P	The additional benefit of differential pricing by e-commerce company to the loyal consumer
M	Compensation of e-commerce company to the loyal consumer for differential pricing
Te	The reputation value of the loyal consumer to e-commerce company
Ul	The utility obtained by the loyal consumer from purchasing goods
Ud	The utility obtained by the disloyal consumer from purchasing goods
Cc	The cost of consumer complaint
α	Probability of loyal consumer discovering differential pricing under government loose supervision, and
	The cost of strict supervision by the government regulatory department
N	Social reputation loss caused by differential pricing under government loose supervision
R	The social benefit of nondifferential pricing under the government strict supervision
Ie	Fine by government regulatory department for differential pricing to e-commerce company
Ip	Fine by government imposed on the platform for nonsupervision of e-commerce company information resulting in differential pricing
S	The normal benefit obtained by the government from the operation of the e-commerce platform
W	The benefit of the platform reasonably providing information to the e-commerce company
Cp	The cost of the platform’s information supervision on the e-commerce company
F	Fines imposed by the platform to e-commerce company for differential pricing during information supervision
β	The proportion of the fine imposed by the e-commerce platform for differential pricing of e-commerce company,
Tp	The reputation value of the loyal consumer to the e-commerce platform