Does Signing Auditor’s Reputational Promotion Ease the Financing Constraints of Audited Firms?

Table 3

Signing auditor reputational promotion and corporate financing constraints.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Full sample	BIG4 = 1	BIG4 = 0
AUDITOR	0.269^∗∗	−0.916	0.262^∗∗
	(0.040)	(0.504)	(0.018)
LEV	0.043^∗∗∗	0.523^∗∗∗	0.023^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
ROA	−0.029^∗∗	0.287	−0.019^∗
	(0.034)	(0.134)	(0.091)
CFO	0.020	0.484^∗∗∗	0.005
	(0.154)	(0.000)	(0.710)
AGE	−0.663^∗∗∗	−0.764^∗∗∗	−0.647^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SOE	0.017^∗∗∗	0.085^∗∗∗	0.008^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Tobin’s Q	0.004^∗∗∗	−0.033^∗∗∗	0.004^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
TOP1	0.062^∗∗∗	0.180^∗∗∗	0.051^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BSIZE	0.074^∗∗∗	0.318^∗∗∗	0.047^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
OUTDIR	0.319^∗∗∗	0.899^∗∗∗	0.159^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
DUAL	0.011^∗∗∗	−0.006	0.011^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.769)	(0.000)
BIG4	0.151^∗∗∗
	(0.000)
Market	0.002^∗∗∗	0.030^∗∗∗	−0.0004
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.367)
Industry	Control	Control	Control
Year	Control	Control	Control
Constant	−2.313^∗∗∗	−3.424^∗∗∗	−2.198^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	16536	952	15584
R [2]	0.770	0.711	0.817

Note. P values are in parentheses, and ^∗∗∗, and ^∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Data source: collected and sorted by the authors.