Does Signing Auditor’s Reputational Promotion Ease the Financing Constraints of Audited Firms?

Table 6

Robustness tests on alternative variable of signing auditor reputational promotion.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		BIG4 = = 0	BIG4 = = 1
AUDITOR	0.549^∗∗	0.463^∗∗	−0.874	0.320^∗∗	8.576^∗∗∗
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.675)	(0.026)	0
Auditor × Soe (SIZE)				−0.362^∗	−0.374^∗∗∗
				(0.098)	(0.000)
SIZE					0.008^∗∗∗
					(0.000)
SOE	0.017^∗∗∗	0.00767^∗∗∗	0.085^∗∗∗	−0.023^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
LEV	0.043^∗∗∗	0.022^∗∗∗	0.523^∗∗∗	0.041^∗∗∗	−0.022^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
ROA	−0.029^∗∗	−0.020^∗	0.293	0.026^∗∗∗	−0.034^∗∗∗
	(0.033)	(0.090)	(0.127)	(0.000)	(0.000)
AGE	−0.663^∗∗∗	−0.646^∗∗∗	−0.764^∗∗∗	0.077^∗∗∗	−0.484^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CFO	0.021	0.005	0.481^∗∗∗	0.019^∗∗∗	0.023^∗∗∗
	(0.152)	(0.707)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Tobin’s Q	0.004^∗∗∗	0.004^∗∗∗	−0.034^∗∗∗	0.004^∗∗∗	0.004^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
TOP1	0.062^∗∗∗	0.051^∗∗∗	0.180^∗∗∗	0.045^∗∗∗	0.039^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BSIZE	0.074^∗∗∗	0.047^∗∗∗	0.319^∗∗∗	0.003	0.003
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.578)	(0.570)
OUTDIR	0.319^∗∗∗	0.159^∗∗∗	0.898^∗∗∗	0.004	0.016
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.767)	(0.231)
DUAL	0.011^∗∗∗	0.011^∗∗∗	−0.006	0.004^∗∗∗	0.005^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.793)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Market	0.002^∗∗∗	−0.0004	0.031^∗∗∗	0.001	0.003^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.377)	(0.000)	(0.650)	(0.000)
BIG4	0.151^∗∗∗
	(0.000)
Year	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Industry	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Constant	−2.313^∗∗∗	−2.198^∗∗∗	−3.427^∗∗∗	−3.549^∗∗∗	−2.641^∗∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	16536	15584	952	16536	16536
R^2	0.77	0.817	0.71	0.81	0.769

Note. P values are in parentheses, and ^∗, ^∗∗, and ^∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Data source: collected and sorted by the authors.