Research Article
[Retracted] Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Support for Science-Tech Enterprises’ Innovation with Government Participation
Table 1
Parameter setting and explanations.
| Parameters | Explanations |
| | Financial institutes’ investments to enterprises with high R&D intensity | | Financial institutes’ investments to enterprises with low R&D intensity | | R&D expense as % of financing for enterprises with high R&D intensity | | R&D expense as % of financing for enterprises with low R&D intensity | | Revenue per unit R&D expense for enterprises with high R&D intensity | | Revenue per unit R&D expense for enterprises with low R&D intensity | | Government subsidies to enterprises with high R&D intensity | | Government subsidies to enterprises with low R&D intensity | | Reputation multiplier by government subsidies | | Administrative costs of government subsidies | | Economic and social externality multiplier by innovation of enterprises with high R&D intensity | | Economic and social externality multiplier by innovation of enterprises with low R&D intensity | | Equity investment earnings as % of revenue | | Debt investment yield with government subsidies | | Debt investment yield without government subsidies | | Probability of enterprises adopting high R&D intensity strategy | | Probability of government adopting subsidy policy | | Probability of equity investment from financial institutes |
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