Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China

Table 1

Mixed strategy payoff matrix of developers, consumers, and governments.

The game party		Consumers^②	Governments^③
			Providing incentive polices z	Providing no incentive polices(1 − z)
Developers^①	Developing green housing x	Purchasing green housing y	①: AP + AZ − (CP + Cz) + θD2 + AQ	①: AP + AZ − (CP + Cz)+AQ
			②: SP + φSZ1 + ηSZ2 − AP − AZ + (1 − θ)D2	②: SP + φSZ1 + ηSZ2 − AP − AZ
			③: G1 + G2 − D1 − D2	③: G2
		Purchasing ordinary housing (1 − y)	①: –(CP + Cz) + θD2 + AQ	①: –(CP + Cz) + AQ
			②: SP − AP	②: SP − AP
			③: G1 + G2 − D1 − θD2 − D3	③: G2 − D3
	Developing ordinary housing (1 − x)	Purchasing green housing y	①: –CP	①: –CP
			②: SP + φSZ1 + ηSZ2 − AP − AZ + (1 − θ)D2;	②: SP + φSZ1 + ηSZ2 − AP − AZ
			③: G1 − D1 − (1 − θ)D2	③: 0
		Purchasing ordinary housing (1 − y)	①: AP − CP	①: AP − CP
			②: SP − AP	②: SP − AP
			③: G1 − D1	③: 0