Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts

<div>Time evolution of the mean ratio of the cooperators according to the types of nodes. More than half of the people at the hubs remain cooperative, while over two-thirds of the people at nonhubs quickly turn selfish. The results are obtained from 100,000 times of Monte Carlo simulations with <svg height="8.55521pt" id="M89" style="vertical-align:-0.2063904pt" version="1.1" viewbox="-0.0498162 -8.34882 28.698 8.55521" width="28.698pt" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><path d="M545 106L524 126C493 85 467 65 455 65C438 65 427 113 405 238C448 295 498 362 543 439L533 448L478 435C453 386 423 331 398 295H395C370 404 347 448 282 448C169 448 23 309 23 153C23 54 65 -12 128 -12C203 -12 283 70 339 155H341C360 29 380 -12 411 -12C444 -12 491 11 545 106ZM333 204C265 95 210 54 169 54C137 54 113 96 113 171C113 302 191 405 252 405C301 405 318 306 333 204Z" id="g113-223"></path><glyph.data ascent="3473" descent="-2876" horiz-adv-x="568" vert-adv-y="568"></glyph.data></g><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,11.017,0)"><path d="M535 323V373H52V323H535ZM535 138V188H52V138H535Z" id="g117-34"></path><glyph.data ascent="3473" descent="-2876" horiz-adv-x="587" vert-adv-y="587"></glyph.data></g><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,22.28,0)"><path d="M285 378C315 398 338 416 353 432C373 451 384 474 384 503C384 579 325 635 236 635H235C182 635 136 610 108 579L65 516L85 496C110 533 150 575 205 575C258 575 300 543 300 481C300 407 232 369 141 339L147 310C163 315 188 321 211 321C268 321 338 284 338 192C338 94 288 40 217 40C160 40 119 68 93 91C85 98 77 97 69 91C60 84 47 71 46 58C44 46 48 35 62 22C75 10 116 -12 162 -12C234 -12 424 62 424 224C424 297 373 359 285 376V378Z" id="g113-52"></path><glyph.data ascent="3473" descent="-2876" horiz-adv-x="480" vert-adv-y="480"></glyph.data></g></svg>.</div>

Complexity

Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts

Figure 8