Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs

<div>The impact of <svg height="13.8491pt" id="M452" style="vertical-align:-4.56077pt" version="1.1" viewbox="-0.0498162 -9.28833 12.5439 13.8491" width="12.5439pt" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><path d="M529 97L508 118C475 75 449 58 438 58C428 58 421 66 415 104C393 234 374 403 364 496C345 670 307 712 254 712C220 712 174 691 153 669L161 645C176 653 194 658 206 658C237 658 261 640 278 562C287 522 290 483 293 434C223 269 110 105 23 9L32 -12C59 -6 85 0 108 7C152 64 251 252 300 366C307 297 315 221 337 82C346 24 363 -12 393 -12C425 -12 475 13 529 97Z"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.0091,0,0,-0.0091,7.761,3.132)"><path d="M434 650H168L162 618C248 609 258 608 243 528L174 155C163 93 153 39 138 1C110 -68 67 -98 24 -111L37 -147C55 -144 75 -136 94 -128C185 -87 232 -12 259 139L328 528C342 605 349 609 427 618L434 650Z"></path></g></svg> on the equilibrium utilities of player<i> J</i>.</div>

Complexity

fig4

Figure 4

Figure 4: Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs 