Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Stress Effect of Cross-Regional Transfer of Resource-Exhausted Enterprises

Table 1

Major notations.

Notations	Description
X	The probability of strict supervision by the central government is x, and the probability of nonstrict supervision is ,
Y	The probability of strict implementation by the operation recipient local governments is y, and the probability of nonstrict implementation is ,
Z	The probability of complete pollution control by the transferring enterprises is z, and the probability of noncomplete pollution control is ,
G	Transfer cost for the enterprises’ cross-regional transfer
T	Reduced raw material transportation costs due to enterprises’ cross-regional transfer
E	Environmental protection fees invested by transfer enterprises for complete pollution control
	Government subsidies when transfer enterprises completely control pollution
	Rewards given by the central government to the local government for strict implementation (when the central government supervises strictly)
	The cost of strict implementation by the local government
	The cost of strict supervision by the central government
	Local government’s fines for transfer enterprises which noncompletely control pollution (when the central government strictly supervises)
	Central government’s fines for transfer enterprises which noncompletely control pollution (when the local government chooses nonstrict implementation)
W	The economic and ecological benefits for local areas engendered by complete pollution control of the transfer enterprises (when the central government supervises strictly)
H	Punishments given by the central government to the local government for nonstrict implementation (when the central government supervises strictly)
M	The socioeconomic benefit under the condition that the central government supervises strictly, the operation recipient local government implements strictly, and the transfer enterprises control pollution completely
θ	The proportion of transfer enterprises in environmental pollution control is θ,
β	The extent of the local government’s implementation of environmental regulation is β,
	The intensity of the central government’s supervision over the operation recipient local government is ,