The Evolution of Collective Strategies in SMEs’ Innovation: A Tripartite Game Analysis and Application

Table 1

Parameter description.

Parameters	Descriptions
x	The probability that the government subsidizes SMEs’ innovation
y	The probability that the external investors invest SMEs’ innovation
z	The probability that SMEs implement technological innovation
	The social benefit of SMEs with general production management
	The social benefit of SMEs with technological innovation
	The social benefit increase of SMEs’ innovation when the government adopts the “Subsidize” strategy and external investors adopt the “Invest” strategy
	The social benefit increase of SMEs’ innovation when the government adopts the “Not subsidize” strategy and the external investors adopt the “Invest” strategy
S	The amount of government subsidies for SMEs’ innovation
P	The investment amount of the external investors in SMEs’ innovation
i	The investment return rate of the external investors in SMEs’ innovation
	Investors’ appraisal costs for SMEs
	The benefits of SMEs when they adopt the “Innovate” strategy
	The benefits of SMEs when they adopt the “Not innovate” strategy
	The increase in benefits of SMEs’ innovation when the external investors adopt the “Invest” strategy