Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Table 1

Variables in the game among the organization, miners, and managers.

Variables	Meaning of the variables	Notes
x	Incentive ratio	0 ≤ x ≤ 1
y	Safe operation ratio	0 ≤ y ≤ 1
z	Safety supervision ratio	0 ≤ z ≤ 1
	Positive incentive profits of organization	> 0
	Positive incentive cost of organization	>
	General incentive profits of organization	> 0
	General incentive cost of organization	> 0
	Safety performance of safe operation of miners	>
	Safety rewards of safe operation of miners under positive incentives	>
	Safety rewards of safe operation of miners under general incentives	> 0
	Safe operation cost of miners	> 0
	Physical and mental profits of unsafe operation of miners	> 0
	Safety performance of unsafe operation of miners	> 0
	Unsafe operation cost of miners	> 0
	The fine of unsafe operation of miners	> 0
	The bribe cost of miner paying to the manager	> 0
	The “commission” profits from fines for manager’s safety supervision	> 0
	Safety performance of safety supervision of managers	>
	Safety rewards of safety supervision of managers under positive incentives	>
	Safety rewards of safety supervision of managers under general incentives	> 0
	Safety supervision cost or rent-seeking cost of managers	> 0
	The “bribe” profits of managers	> 0
	Safety performance of rent-seeking of managers	> 0