The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

Table 1

Parameter descriptions.

Stakeholders	Parameters	Descriptions
Agricultural enterprises	x	The probability that agricultural enterprises carry out low-carbon innovation
		The benefits when agricultural enterprises do not carry out low-carbon innovation
		The benefit increase when the government chooses “regulation” strategies and the farmers adopt low-carbon technology
		The benefit increase when the government choose “not regulation” strategies and the farmers adopt low-carbon technology
		The costs increase when agricultural enterprises carry out low-carbon innovation
Government	y	The probability that government regulates low-carbon innovation
		The social benefit when the agricultural enterprises adopt general innovation
		The benefit increase when the government adopts “regulation” strategies and the agricultural enterprises carry out low-carbon innovation
		The benefit increase when the government does not regulate and the agricultural enterprises adopt low-carbon innovation
	F	The amount of carbon taxes levied on agricultural enterprises adopting “not low-carbon innovation” strategies
		The ratio of innovation subsidies to agricultural enterprises’ low-carbon innovation input cost
		Carbon tax rate
		The ratio of adoption subsidies to farmers’ low-carbon technology purchase cost
Farmers	z	The probability that farmers adopt low-carbon technology
		The benefits when farmers do not adopt low-carbon technology
		The increase benefits when farmers adopt low-carbon technology
		The costs increase when farmers adopt low-carbon technology
		The benefits increase when agricultural enterprises carry out low-carbon innovation, regardless of whether farmers adopt low-carbon technology