Research Article

An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Analysis to Conflicts among Stakeholders Involved in the Operation of Municipal Waste Incineration

Table 4

Variable type of the SD model.

VariableType

Administrative penaltiesAuxiliary
Compensation factorConstant
Concentration of pollutantsConstant
Cost for enterprise to upgrade facilitiesAuxiliary
Cost of complaintsAuxiliary
Difference in profit while upgrading facilitiesAuxiliary
Difference in payoffs under governmental regular inspectionAuxiliary
Economic penaltyConstant
Enterprise’s expected payoffsAuxiliary
Enterprise’s expected payoffs with upgrading facilitiesAuxiliary
Enterprise’s expected payoffs without upgrading facilitiesAuxiliary
Illegal emissionsAuxiliary
Expected payoffs of governmental regular inspectionAuxiliary
Expected payoffs of residents who do not appeal to compensationAuxiliary
Expected payoffs of residents who appeal to compensationAuxiliary
Expected payoffs that the government does irregular inspectionAuxiliary
Expected payoffs of governmentAuxiliary
Government subsidyConstant
Health loss that residents exposed to environmentAuxiliary
Local salaryConstant
Maintenance costAuxiliary
Expected payoffs of residentsAuxiliary
Power generationConstant
Power generation capacityConstant
Probability change on enterpriseRate
Probability change on governmentRate
Probability change on residentsRate
Probability that the government implements regular inspectionLevel
Probability that residents appeal to compensationLevel
Probability that the enterprise upgrades facilitiesLevel
Profit of power generationAuxiliary
Residents’ compensationAuxiliary
Standard value of pollutantsConstant
The cost of governmental regular inspectionConstant
The expected compensation of residentsAuxiliary
Cost of waste incinerationAuxiliary
Waste treatment capacityConstant