Study on the Compliance Management of the Electricity Market in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

Table 1

Notation.

Parameters	Descriptions	Range
	Probability of noncompliance of the power generator
	Probability of lax inspection of the compliance department
	Probability of supervision of the government regulatory agency
	Strict inspection costs of the compliance department
	Lax inspection costs of the compliance department
	Psychological cost of the power generator
	Psychological cost of the compliance department
	Benefits of noncompliance of the power generator
	Rent-seeking costs of the power generator
	Fines imposed by the government regulatory agency on the power generator
	Fines imposed by the government regulatory agency on the compliance department
	Losses suffered by the power generator after its violations are revealed
	Losses suffered by the compliance department after its violations are revealed
	Reputation gains of the compliance department by disclosing rent-seeking behavior of the power generator
	Supervision costs of the government regulatory agency
	Benefits from prestige increase of the government regulatory agency
	Losses of prestige after failing to discover market violations