Food Safety Risk Communication between the Food Regulator and Consumer in China: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

Table 1

Description of model parameters.

Variables	Implications
D11	The returns of local government on the food risk communication duties
C11	Cost for local government to perform risk communication duties
C12	Cost for local government not to perform risk communication duties
R	Reward of local government performing food safety risk communication duties from central government with strong supervision when the consumer chooses proactive communication
	The possibility of local government not performing risk communication duties will be discovered under weak supervision
k	Degree of punishment from the central government after finding that local government does not perform risk communication duties during strong supervision
S	Extra return if local government does not perform risk communication duties
L11	Negative effect on the reputation of local government not performing risk communication duties when the consumer chooses proactive communication
F	Potential loss for local government with performance risk communication duties if the consumer chooses reactive communication
B11	Credibility enhancement of local government due to performing risk communication duties
ξ	The probability that local government chooses to perform risk communication duties
D21	The return of consumer choosing proactive communication if local government chooses to perform risk communication duties
D22	Short-term gains of consumer due to reactive communication when the local government performs risk communication duties
D23	The return of the consumer choosing proactive communication if a local government chooses not to perform risk communication duties
C21	Cost for the consumer choosing proactive communication to learn more information about food safety issues (including time, economy, and opportunity)
C22	Cost for the consumer choosing reactive communication about food safety issues
L21	Potential loss of consumer’s reactive communication in food safety issues under the local government performs risk communication duties
B21	Positive effect on consumer choosing proactive communication if the central government has strong supervision
B22	Extra return for the consumer when choosing proactive communication if local government performs risk communication duties under strong supervision
	The probability that the consumer chooses proactive communication
D31	The revenue of the central government
C31	Cost for central government to implement strong supervision
C32	Cost for central government to implement weak supervision
B31	Credibility enhancement of central government due to local government perform risk communication duties under strong supervision
L31	Credibility loss of the central government under proactive communication due to local government does not perform risk communication duties
	Social welfare improvement with proactive communication of food safety risks by the consumer
	The probability that the central government chooses strong supervision