Food Safety Risk Communication between the Food Regulator and Consumer in China: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

Table 2

Payoff matrix of the tripartite game.

Local government	Consumer	Central government
		Strong supervision ()	Weak supervision ()
Performing risk communication duties ()	Proactive communication ()	D11 − C11 + R + B11	D11 − C11 + B11
		D21 − C21 + B21 + B22	D21 − C21
		D31 − C31 + B31 + W	D31 − C32
	Reactive communication ()	D11 − C11 + B11 − F	D11 − C11 − F
		D22 − C22 − L21	D22 − C22 − L21
		D31 − C31 + B31	D31 − C32
Not performing risk communication duties ()	Proactive communication ()	D11 − C12 − L11 − kS
		D23 − C21 + B21	D23 − C21
		D31 − C31 + kS	D31 − C32 − L31
	Reactive communication ()	D11 − C12 − kS
		0	0
		D31 − C31 + kS	D31 − C32