Research Article

Food Safety Risk Communication between the Food Regulator and Consumer in China: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

Table 4

Strategy space of the tripartite game model.

Equilibrium pointStrategy spacePolicy effectiveness

E8 (1, 1, 1)Perform risk communication duties, proactive communication, strong supervisionMost ideal
E5 (1, 1, 0)Perform risk communication duties, proactive communication, weak supervisionIdeal
E7 (0, 1, 1)Not to perform risk communication duties, proactive communication, strong supervisionMedium
E4 (1, 0, 0)Perform risk communication duties, reactive communication, weak supervision 
E3 (0, 1, 0)Not to perform risk communication duties, proactive communication, weak supervision 
E6 (1, 0. 1)Perform risk communication duties, reactive communication, strong supervisionLeast ideal