Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Dissemination of False Information by Multiple Parties after Major Emergencies

Table 1

Parameters and symbols.

Parameter	Definition
λ	Internet users’ psychological identification with opinion leaders.
ΔC	Additional regulatory costs paid by regulators when they choose strict regulation.
Sr	Income of regulatory institutions when they choose strict regulation (e.g., approval from Internet users, improvement of self-image, etc.).
Pr	Loss incurred by regulatory institutions when they loosen regulation and Internet users reject comments released by opinion leaders (e.g., increasing panic felt by Internet users due to missing information and its impact on social stability).
P	Loss incurred by regulatory institutions when Internet users adopt false information and their subsequent incorrect judgement has negative impact (e.g., decrease in government credibility, losses due to public panic, and mass events).
Ps	Impact of negative information released by opinion leaders when regulatory institutions choose strict regulation.
Pl	Impact of negative information released by opinion leaders when regulatory institutions choose loose regulation.
Ir	Increase of social stability when Internet users adopt positive information.
π1	Probability that regulatory institutions punish opinion leaders disseminating false information under strict regulation.
π2	Probability that regulatory institutions punish opinion leaders disseminating false information under loose regulation.
Lr	Punishment imposed by regulatory institutions on opinion leaders disseminating false information.
Cl	Costs of investigation and evidence collection paid by opinion leaders disseminating positive information.
I	Reward for opinion leaders disseminating positive information under strict regulation (e.g., regulatory institutions’ recognition of opinion leaders).
Mp	Comments from opinion leaders disseminating positive information.
Mn	Comments from opinion leaders disseminating negative information.
ΔIl	Additional income gained by opinion leaders when Internet users adopt false information (e.g., attention, visitor traffic).
Lp	Loss of attention when Internet users reject positive information released by opinion leaders.
Ln	Loss of attention when Internet users reject false information released by opinion leaders.
Sn	Income of Internet users when strict regulation of information platforms brings benefits (e.g., generally a greater dissemination of correct information).
Ca	Costs of time and energy of Internet users when they adopt comments from opinion leaders.
Pn	Panic caused by a general lack of information when Internet users reject comments under loose regulation.
IP	The sense of participation and satisfaction when Internet users adopt positive information released by opinion leaders.
In	The sense of participation and satisfaction when internet users adopt negative information released by opinion leaders.
Cn	Costs incurred by Internet users in independently verifying the accuracy of information released by opinion leaders.
x	Probability that regulatory institutions choose strict regulation.
Y	Probability that opinion leaders choose to release positive information.
Z	Probability that Internet users adopt information released by opinion leaders.