Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Dissemination of False Information by Multiple Parties after Major Emergencies

Table 2

The tripartite game income matrix for regulatory institutions, opinion leaders, and Internet users.

Regulatory institutions and opinion leaders				Internet users
				Adoption	Rejection
Regulatory institutions	Strict regulation	Opinion leaders	Positive information	−ΔC + Ir + Sr	−ΔC + Sr
				I − Cl	I − Cl − Lp
				Ip + λMp + Sn−(1 − λ)Cn − Ca	Sn
			False information	−ΔC − P − Ps + Sr	−ΔC + Sr − Ps
				−π1Lr + ΔIl	−π1Lr − Ln
				In − λMn + Sn−(1 − λ)Cn − Ca	Sn
	Loose regulation	Opinion leaders	Positive information	Ir	−Pr
				−Cl	−Cl − Lp
				IP + λMp−(1 − λ)Cn − Ca	−Pn
			False information	−P − Pl	−Pr − Pl
				−π2Lr + ΔIl	−π2Lr − Ln
				In − λMn−(1 − λ)Cn − Ca	−Pn