Study on the Multi-Governance of Public Rental Housing Exit in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

Table 1

Related parameters and definition.

Parameter	Definition
	Probability of positive supervision adopted by government,
	Probability of tenants actively exiting under the epidemic,
	Severity degree of the epidemic，
	The impact coefficient of the epidemic，
	The government's ability to deal with the epidemic
	Public participation degree，
	Fairness degree of public reporting，
	Loss to tenants due to public reporting distortion
	The government losses caused by the public exposure to the illegal behavior of tenants
	Government positive supervision benefits
	Government supervision fixed costs
	The total cost of government supervision
	Subsidy for tenants exiting actively
	Saved rent for tenants adopting delay exit
	Penalties for tenants delaying exit when being investigated
	Increased social benefits brought about by tenants' active exit
	Declined social benefits caused by tenants' delay exit
	The probability that the government investigates the illegal behavior
	The government's own supervision capabilities