Compensation Incentive of Executives under the Situation of Synergy or Mutual Exclusion of Corporate Profit and Innovation Tasks: Based on Incentive Game Model between Principal and Agent

Table 5

Correlation analysis between profit and innovation tasks (synergistic).

	Lnpay	ECS	ROE	μ	LEV	GQP	LNBOARD	DUAL	GROWTH	RATIO
Lnpay	1	0.195	0.232	−0.019	0.135	−0.028	0.109	−0.022	0.066	0.010
ECS	0.195	1	0.094	−0.074	0.002	0.066	−0.012	−0.020	0.033	0.026
ROE	0.016	0.016	1	−0.008	−0.066	0.160	0.073	0.010	0.291	−0.034
μ	−0.021	−0.076	−0.004	1	−0.013	−0.051	−0.016	0.041	−0.368	−0.022
LEV	0.075	0.008	−0.075	−0.009	1	0.040	0.110	−0.087	0.018	−0.014
GQP	−0.011	0.074	0.003	−0.045	0.030	1	−0.010	−0.027	0.049	0.047
LNBOARD	0.137	−0.014	0.010	−0.028	0.075	0.012	1	−0.175	0.053	−0.637
DUAL	−0.011	−0.022	0.018	0.038	−0.069	−0.030	−0.158	1	0.007	0.105
GROWTH	0.017	0.013	0.035	−0.302	0.018	0.046	0.070	−0.017	1	−0.016
RATIO	0.015	0.038	−0.028	−0.022	0.010	0.052	−0.556	0.093	−0.026	1

Note. significant at 1% level, significant at 5% level, significant at 10% level. The lower-left corner presents the result from Pearson correlation analysis, and the upper-right corner represents the results from Spearman correlation analysis.