Evolutionary Game of Value Synergy in Industrial Chain: In the Context of “Chain Chief System”
Table 1
Model parameters.
Variables
Specific content
Government (chain chief)
The basic benefit is when the “chain chief system” is in place but the government fails to perform its duties
Incremental base earnings when the government performs its chain chief duties
The government’s revenue is when the government takes full responsibility as the chain chief and establishes the corresponding industrial chain value synergy ecology
The government’s revenue when the government fails to fulfill the responsibility of chain chief, and the enterprises in the industrial chain spontaneously form the industrial chain value synergy ecology
Basic input from the government when implementing the “chain chief system”
The government’s public investment in the industrial chain when doing its duty of chain chief, such as formulating “one policy for one chain,” building industrial blocks or key parks, providing industrial chain strategic consulting institutions and comprehensive public service platforms, and establishing information and data sharing mechanisms
Government incentives and subsidies for chain leader enterprises
Government incentives and subsidies for other enterprises in the industrial chain
x
The probability of the government fulfills its duty as chain chief
The probability that the government does not fulfill its duty as chain chief
Chain leader enterprise
The basic revenue of the chain leader enterprises under the “chain chief system”
The basic cost of the chain leader enterprises when their responsibilities are not assumed
The cooperation cost for the responsibilities of the chain leader, such as developing supplier standards, building upstream and downstream cooperation systems, and setting up specialized departments to connect with cooperators
Penalties in case of noncooperation or inaction of the chain leader enterprise
In the case where the government assumes the responsibility of the chain chief, the free-riding benefits of the chain leader enterprise when the chain leader enterprise does not assume the responsibility of the chain leader and other enterprises actively cooperate
In the case that the government does not assume the responsibility of the chain chief, the free-riding benefits of the chain leader enterprise when the chain leader enterprise does not assume the responsibility of the chain leader enterprises and other enterprises actively cooperate
y
Probability of the chain leader enterprise assuming chain-owning responsibilities
Probability that the chain leader enterprise does not assume the responsibilities of the chain leader
Other enterprises in the industry chain
The basic revenue of other enterprises in the chain chief system
The basic cost of other enterprises in the chain chief system
Additional cooperation costs for other enterprises to cooperate with the chain leader enterprises, such as carrying out production according to the standards of the chain leader enterprises
The free-riding benefits of the other enterprises in the case where the government and chain leader enterprises are doing their duties
′
The free-riding benefits of the other enterprises in the case where the government and chain leader enterprises are not doing their duties
z
The probability of other enterprises cooperating with the industrial chain value synergy
The probability that other enterprises will not cooperate with the industrial chain value synergy
Synergistic benefits and cost of cooperation variables
D
The overall incremental net benefit to the business results from industrial chain value synergy when the government performs its duty as chain chief
The overall incremental net benefit to the business results from industrial chain value synergy when the government does not perform its duty as chain chief
k
The revenue coefficient, which acts on revenue D, takes into account the industrial characteristics, risks, and return on the initial investment. A larger k indicates a greater contribution to the revenue
α
The distribution coefficient of the industrial chain synergy income, the distribution coefficient of the chain leader enterprise is α, then the distribution coefficient of other enterprises is 1 − α. When α is close to 1, it means that the concentration of the industry is high
β
Cost coefficient, which acts on the extra cost paid by chain leader enterprises for industrial chain value synergy, when there are fewer barriers to industrial data or scene sharing, there is β < 1, and vice versa β > 1
γ
Cost coefficient, which acts on the extra cost paid by other enterprises for industrial chain value synergy, when there are fewer barriers to industrial data or scene sharing, there is γ < 1, and vice versa γ > 1
