Research on the Establishment and Stability of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region Air Pollution Cooperative Control Alliance: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Table 2

A brief summary of most relevant works.

Ref.	Year.	Method.	Shortcoming.	Finding.
Li et al.	[30]	A CLSC model with a manufacturer and a retailer, and the market demand is determined by the price, the carbon emission reduction level as well as the low-carbon promotion effort	First, most of the existing research literature assumes that local governments participating in cooperative air pollution control coalitions are perfectly rational. Second, the analysis of the stability of control alliances and the sustainability of environmental protection is insufficient. Last, fewer studies have incorporated central government control into the game process	First, this study assumes that local governments are finitely rational. Second, they have built an alliance of city clusters and hope to promote this model. Last, they constructed two models, one for coalitions without central government constraints and one for coalitions with central government constraints, and the comparison of the two models can illustrate the role of central government in the control process
De Frutos et al.	[31]	The paper analysed a transboundary pollution differential game where pollution control is spatially distributed among a number of agents with predetermined spatial relationships
Cabo et al.	[34]	A dynamic game was used to study a transboundary pollution problem between two neighbouring regions
Jørgensen et al.	[32]	The paper provided a survey of the literature, which utilizes dynamic state-space games
Artem et al.	[46]	The paper investigated a dynamic game with network externalities in which a state variable of each player is influenced by her own decision and the decisions of her predecessors in the network
Rocha ABD. et al.	[36]	The paper used an evolutionary game model to study the interplay in a country facing a pollution trap
Kucukmehmetoglu et al.	[40]	The cooperative game theory was used as a water allocation optimization model
Petrosyan et al.	[38]	This study developed a novel class of cooperative dynamic games with multiple durable controls of different lag durations affecting both the players’ payoffs and the state dynamics
Giovanni and Marta	[47]	The paper proposed a dynamic game about the process of formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs)
Luqman et al.	[50]	The paper used dynamic optimisation to derive the minimum penalty cost on nations every single time