Research on the Establishment and Stability of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region Air Pollution Cooperative Control Alliance: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Table 3

Main parameters and their meaning.

Sign	Variable	Sources
	Total cost of air pollution for cities to conduct territorial autonomy	Luqman et al. [50]
	Loss of economic growth in the short term that cities can accept due to air pollution control	Mahan et al. and Artem et al. [44, 46]
	The damage caused by atmospheric pollution to cities	Hongwei Wang et al. [37]
	Self-benefits of cities complying with territorial autonomy strategies	de Frutos et al. and Cabo et al. [31, 34]
	Public benefits to the region from cities selecting territorial autonomy for air pollution	Jørgensen et al. [35]
	Public benefits to the region from territorially autonomous air pollution control in both cities	Kucukmehmetoglu et al. [40]
	Costs for two cities to reach a cooperative control alliance	Shan et al. [45]
	Total benefits to the region from the cooperative control of the two cities	Rocha et al. [36]
	The central government’s punishment for cities that do not conduct air pollution control	Petrosyan et al. [38]
	Central government incentives for cities that conduct air pollution control	Michele [39]
	The coefficient of intercity externalities, the negative externalities of air pollution, and the positive externalities of air pollution control are all	Artem et al. [46]