Research Article

Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China

Table 2

Description of variables.

Types of variablesName of indexDescription

Dependent variableEfficiency of resource allocation (Efficiency)The percentage change of total factor productivity measured by Malmquist model in DEA model

Independent variablesMonetary incentive (Pay)Ln (total compensation of the top three executives)
Stock ownership incentive (Stock)Ln (number of shares held by executives + 1)
Perquisite consumption incentive (Consumption)Administrative expenses/operating income

Control variablesCash holding (Cash)Balance of cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period/total assets
Asset-liability ratio (Lever)Total liabilities/total assets
Growth (Growth)Increase rate of business revenue
Firm age (Firmage)The establishment of the company to the corresponding balance sheet date
Ownership concentration (First)The largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio
Nature of property right (Owner)Dummy variable, 0 for state-owned enterprises and 1 for private enterprises
Mean tenure of executives (Mtenure)Average tenure of senior management team members
Mean age of executives (Mage)Average age of senior management team members
Mean education background of executives (Meducation)Average education background of senior management team members: 1 means technical secondary school or below, 2 means junior college, 3 means bachelor’s degree, 4 means master’s degree, 5 means doctoral degree, 6 means other (degrees announced in other forms, such as honorary doctorate, correspondence), and 7 means MBA/EMBA
Year (Year)Dummy variables based on 2016