Analysis of Economic Effect and Mechanism of Basic Medical Insurance for Urban Employees in China

Table 7

Adverse selection and moral hazard effect.

	Variable	Having a regular job		No fixed work
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Selection equation	Expenditure equation	Selection equation	Expenditure equation
Explained variable: logarithm of total medical expenses	Interaction effect	0.0117	−1.185	−0.0408	1.536
	(Treat × time)	[0.0248]	[1.5332]	[0.0338]	[0.8333]
	Treatment effect	0.00655	−1.218	0.0048	−0.557
	(Treat)	[0.0178]	[0.8718]	[0.0244]	[0.5428]
	Time effect	−0.0197	0.826	−0.00391	0.124
	(Time)	[0.0175]	[0.9482]	[0.0221]	[0.4453]
Explained variable: logarithm of self-paid medical expenses	Interaction effect	0.0117	−1.146	−0.0408	0.932
	(Treat × time)	[0.0248]	[1.4467]	[0.0338]	[0.7869]
	Treatment effect	0.00655	−1.328	0.0048	−0.538
	(Treat)	[0.0178]	[0.7902]	[0.0244]	[0.5396]
	Time effect	−0.0197	0.769	−0.00391	0.115
	(Time)	[0.0175]	[0.9180]	[0.0221]	[0.4404]
	Provinces	Control	Control	Control	Control
	Sample size	898	78	933	135

^∗Statistical significance at the 10% level. The selection equations of models (1) and (3) are estimated by probit model, which gives marginal effect. The standard errors are in brackets, and the standard errors of models (2) and (4) are obtained by bootstrap method. The control variables of the expenditure equation include age, square of age, gender, nationality, marital status, education level, occupation, permanent address, income, previous medical history, smoking, and drinking. The control variables of the selection equation also add whether there are other relatives.