Executive Stock Ownership and Enterprise Digital Transformation: Interest Convergence or Trench Defense

Table 4

Test results of moderating effect.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Differences in property rights	Industry competition degree difference	Ownership concentration difference
	DITL	DITL	DITL
MS	0.943	1.235	1.555
	(5.47)	(5.57)	(4.05)
MSQ	−1.215	−1.814	−2.283
	(−3.95)	(−4.51)	(−3.02)
MS × SOE	8.710
	(4.67)
MSQ × SOE	−39.823
	(−4.85)
MS × HHI		−2.197
		(−2.11)
MSQ × HHI		3.967
		(1.97)
MS × TOP1			−1.910
			(−1.76)
MSQ × TOP1			3.187
			(1.74)
SOE	−0.262	−0.243	−0.237
	(−13.49)	(−12.88)	(−12.41)
HHI		−0.722
		(−11.11)
TOP1	−0.133	−0.126	−0.115
	(−2.41)	(−2.28)	(−1.89)
SIZE	0.149	0.153	0.149
	(17.38)	(17.91)	(17.28)
LEV	−0.241	−0.225	−0.248
	(−5.01)	(−4.67)	(−5.15)
ROA	−0.089	−0.135	−0.077
	(−0.68)	(−1.03)	(−0.59)
CASH	−0.533	−0.489	−0.533
	(−4.61)	(−4.25)	(−4.61)
BOARD	−0.046	−0.041	−0.046
	(−0.94)	(−0.85)	(−0.94)
INDEP	0.894	0.851	0.879
	(5.68)	(5.40)	(5.58)
DUAL	0.071	0.067	0.071
	(3.87)	(3.62)	(3.86)
LISTAGE	0.055	0.045	0.049
	(5.09)	(4.16)	(4.52)
BIG4	−0.053	−0.049	−0.058
	(−1.47)	(−1.35)	(−1.58)
Constants	−2.976	−2.856	−2.966
	(−15.52)	(−14.95)	(−15.47)
YEAR	YES	YES	YES
IND	YES	YES	YES
N	23594	23594	23594
A-R^2	0.231	0.237	0.230

Note: T values calculated according to robust standard errors are in parentheses; , , and denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.