Research Article
The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System
Table 3
Stability of the equilibrium points in Case
1.
| | Equilibrium points | | | | Stability | Conditions |
| | E1 (0, 0, 0) | >0 | — | <0 | Unstable | N/A | | E2 (0, 0, 1) | — | — | >0 | Unstable | N/A | | E3 (0, 1, 0) | >0 | — | <0 | Unstable | N/A | | E4 (1, 0, 0) | <0 | — | <0 | Evolutionary stable strategy | | | E5 (1, 1, 0) | — | — | — | Evolutionary stable strategy | , | | E6 (1, 0, 1) | — | — | >0 | Unstable | N/A | | E7 (0, 1, 1) | <0 | — | >0 | Unstable | N/A | | E8 (1, 1, 1) | <0 | — | — | Evolutionary stable strategy | , |
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