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Parameters | Explanations |
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C | Costs incurred when regulated by the platform supervisor |
C1 | Total costs incurred by the service provider in adopting a trustworthy strategy |
C2 | Total cost to the demand side of the service |
C3 | When the demand side of the service takes trust, the service provider takes untrustworthy, and the platform regulator does not regulate, the provider takes opportunism, causing a perceived loss to the demand side |
C4 | Disguise costs incurred by the service provider in adopting an untrustworthy strategy |
C5 | The platform supervisor will incur additional perceived losses to itself as a result of the service provider’s untrustworthy nature |
G1 | The platform rewards additional service providers for perceived benefits |
Q | History of service interactions |
W | The supervising platform supervisor also imposes additional perceived penalties on the service provider for noncompliance when the service provider acts in breach of trust |
R1 | Benefits received by the platform supervisor when choosing a supervision strategy |
R2 | Transaction prices for cooperation between service providers and service demanders |
R3 | Additional perceived benefits from mutual trust |
R4 | Additional perceived benefits are received when the service demand side takes trust, the service provider acts untrustworthy, and the service provider acts opportunistically when the platform supervisor does not supervise |
A | Share of additional benefits R3 to service providers and service demanders |
B | Revenue earned by the platform supervisor for the “nonsupervision” strategy as a percentage of revenue earned by the platform supervisor for the “supervision” strategy |
G2 | Platform rewards additional service demand-side perceived benefits |
K | When the service demander chooses to trust and the service provider chooses to be untrustworthy, that is, the service provider defaults, the service provider needs to pay a certain penalty to the service demander |
α | Degree of synergy between multiple service entities |
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