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| i-Type of companies, (i = 1, 2 for type A company and type B company, respectively) |
| x: probability of type A company participating in the sharing |
| y: probability of type B company participating in the sharing |
| z: probability of government’s regulation |
| Di: cost of companies when they do not participate in the sharing |
| : income of companies when they do not participate in the sharing |
| Ci: extra cost of companies when only one company participates in the sharing |
| R: income of companies when they all participate in the sharing |
| αi: proportion of income when they all participate in the sharing |
| γi: trust level of companies when the company participates in the sharing |
| Ti: potential trust income when the company participates in the sharing |
| Li: trust income. The loss of trust in nonsharing is −Li (Li = γiTi) |
| Ri: the additional income of company when only one company participate in the sharing |
| Si: punishment of company that the company does not share by the government |
| CG: cost of government’s regulation |
| θi: utilization efficiency of government investment when one company does not participate in the sharing |
| βi: utilization efficiency of government investment when both companies participate in the sharing |
| RG: income of government’s regulation |
| λ: the government’s nonregulation accounted for the proportion of income under regulation |
| : the social income of the government from the completion of shared manufacturing |
| M: the reward given by the state to the government is due to the government’s regulation and completion of shared manufacturing |
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