Study on the Evolutionary Game of Information Security Supervision in Smart Cities under Different Reward and Punishment Mechanisms

<div>The impact of raising the upper limit of <svg height="12.7178pt" id="M183" style="vertical-align:-3.42947pt" version="1.1" viewbox="-0.0498162 -9.28833 8.47692 12.7178" width="8.47692pt" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><path d="M619 670C619 686 593 712 555 712S459 686 410 634S335 504 320 430H250L219 400L222 388H312L258 73C223 -133 201 -166 187 -180C175 -191 158 -199 140 -199C123 -199 88 -188 74 -172C68 -166 63 -164 54 -171C38 -185 23 -201 23 -215C23 -236 60 -261 93 -261C122 -261 161 -247 207 -200C268 -138 300 -71 337 94C365 220 376 277 394 387L501 399L521 430H401C432 623 464 665 501 665C524 665 544 651 567 627C577 617 583 618 592 625C601 631 619 651 619 670Z"></path></g></svg> on local government and enterprise.</div>

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Figure 11

Figure 11: Study on the Evolutionary Game of Information Security Supervision in Smart Cities under Different Reward and Punishment Mechanisms 