Network Evolutionary Game-Based Diffusion Mechanism regarding the Nonperformance of Farmers in Agricultural Supply Chain Finance

Table 1

Notation description.

Symbol	Implication
	The amount of accounts receivable of farmers.
	The pledge rate of accounts receivable, .
	Additional benefits obtained from long-term cooperation with the core enterprise in the supply chain and opportunities for bank refinancing when farmers repay on time.
	Lending rate, .
	The yield rate brought by the normal operation of farmers after obtaining bank loans, .
,	The yield rate obtained by farmer 1 and farmer 2 when they choose the default strategy. At this time, farmers may use the bank loans for other purposes (such as investment in high-risk projects) or normal operation, but they will choose not to repay ultimately, .
	The punishment that farmers suffer when they choose the default strategy. Such as the loss of long-term cooperation with core enterprises due to breach of trust, as well as the low cost of credit obtained in the agricultural supply chain finance model.