A Game Theory Approach for Supply Chain Coordination Model with Incentive Mechanisms of Discount and Delay in Payments

<table class="table-group" id="tab7"><tr><td><table class="table"><tr><td class="thead-hr" colspan="2"><hr/></td></tr><tr class="thead"><td class="align_left">Name of the center</td><td class="align_center">Financial holding costs (currency)</td></tr><tr><td class="thead-hr" colspan="2"><hr/></td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">Supplier</td><td class="align_center">180</td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">Manufacturer</td><td class="align_center">210</td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">Distributor</td><td class="align_center">250</td></tr><tr class="table-tr"><td colspan="2"><hr class="tbody-hr"/></td></tr></table></td></tr></table>

<div>Financial holding costs of each unit <span class="nowrap"><svg height="12.5794pt" id="M214" style="vertical-align:-3.29107pt" version="1.1" viewbox="-0.0498162 -9.28833 9.82321 12.5794" width="9.82321pt" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><path d="M499 88L487 113C459 86 422 65 413 65C403 65 403 74 409 98L461 318C487 426 460 448 431 448C408 448 383 441 352 424C305 398 223 344 157 257H155L243 674C249 702 249 712 240 712C227 712 170 680 87 673L82 648H117C155 648 162 644 150 590L23 -4L30 -12C55 -4 81 3 105 8C113 53 131 150 143 187C199 281 323 387 372 387C390 387 393 369 380 311L328 86C313 19 319 -12 347 -12C379 -12 442 24 499 88Z"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.0091,0,0,-0.0091,6.643,3.132)"><path d="M250 606C250 634 233 656 203 656C168 656 146 618 146 593C146 564 169 545 192 545C227 545 250 573 250 606ZM227 95L212 119C187 98 152 71 135 71C129 71 128 78 134 102L207 373C219 418 217 451 194 451C165 451 92 411 30 351L44 326C77 353 106 371 114 371C124 371 121 357 117 341L55 97C32 5 46 -12 70 -12C108 -12 191 51 227 95Z"></path></g></svg>.</span></div>

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

tab7

Table 7

Table 7: A Game Theory Approach for Supply Chain Coordination Model with Incentive Mechanisms of Discount and Delay in Payments 