Dual-Channel Supply Chain Coordination with Loss-Averse Consumers

Table 2

Summary of notations.

Notations	Definition
Indices
A	Retailer 1’s loyal consumers
B	Loss-averse consumers
	Represent retailers
SP	Separate operation model
VI	Vertically integrated operation model
Parameters
	The proportion of A-type consumers
	The proportion of B-type consumers
	Utility that a representative consumer derives from the product
	Total utility that consumers derive from the product
	Quantity purchased by A-type consumers
	Quantity purchased by B-type consumers
	Demand for retailer 1
	Demand for retailer 2
	Utility gain coefficient
	Utility loss coefficient
	The proportion of profit that the manufacturer can get from the vertical coordination chain
	The profit of retailer 1 in SP
	The profit of retailer 2 in SP
	The profit of the integrated manufacturer
	The profit of the integrated manufacturer under
	The profit of the integrated manufacturer under
	The profit of the integrated manufacturer under
	Total sales in VI
	Total sales in SP
	Consumer surplus in VI
	Consumer surplus in SP
Decision variables
	The wholesale price of the upstream manufacturer
	Price set by retailer 1
	Price set by retailer 2