Research on Social Governance of Network Public Opinion: An Evolutionary Game Model

Table 3

The condition of evolutionary stability of equilibrium points.

Equilibrium points	Case 1		Case 2		Case 3		Case 4
	λ1, λ2, λ3	Stability	λ1, λ2, λ3	Stability	λ1, λ2, λ3	Stability	λ1, λ2, λ3	Stability
E1 (0, 0, 0)	+, +, +	Unstable	+, +, −	Unstable	+, \, +	Unstable	+, \, −	Unstable
E2 (1, 0, 0)	−, +, +	Unstable	−, +, \	Unstable	−, \, +	Unstable	−, \,	Uncertain
E3 (0, 1, 0)	\, −, +	Unstable	\, −, \	Uncertain	\, \, +	Unstable	\, \, \	Uncertain
E4 (1, 1, 0)	\, −, +	Unstable	\, −, \	Uncertain	\, \, +	Unstable	\, \, \	Uncertain
E5 (0, 0, 1)	+, +, −	Unstable	+, +, +	Unstable	+, −, −	Unstable	+, −, +	Unstable
E6 (0, 1, 1)	+, −, −	Unstable	+, −, \	Unstable	+, +, −	Unstable	+, +, \	Unstable
E7 (1, 0, 1)	−, +, −	Unstable	−, +, \	Unstable	−, −, −	ESS	−, −, \	Uncertain
E8 (1, 1, 1)	−, −, −	ESS	−, −, \	Uncertain	−, +, −	Unstable	−, +, \	Unstable

Note: “\” indicates that the sign of the eigenvalue is uncertain.