Analysis of the Game Behavior of Smart Community Regulatory Participants to Co-Create the Smart City: Post-Human Stakeholder Perspectives

Table 1

Parameter symbols and significance.

Parameter	Significance
Px	The public gains made when the government actively regulates Px > Rx
Rx	Public welfare loss when the government supervises loosely
Cx1	The cost of regulation paid for when the government actively regulates it (Cx1 > Cx2)
Cx2	The cost of regulation incurred when the government regulates it loosely
Py1	Normal income from the operation of smart community
Py2	When the government strictly supervises, it gives smart community self-discipline management rewards (Py2 > Py3)
Py3	Additional credit benefits derived from the self-management of smart community
Py4	Additional benefits earned when smart community is not disciplined
Cy1	The cost of the smart community in self-regulation
Cy2	The cost of smart community paying when they are not disciplined
Cy3	Additional costs incurred when smart community is not self-disciplined (including rent-seeking costs)
Cy4	Punishment of smart community for not being self-disciplined when the government strictly supervises them (including penalties for rent-seeking activities)
Pz1	Normal income of third parties
Pz2	Third parties accept additional proceeds from rent-seeking
Pz3	Rewards for refusing rent-seeking to third parties when governments actively regulate them
Cz1	Cost of third-party supervision (assuming equal rent-seeking)
Cz2	Third-party agencies accept rent-seeking penalties when the government strictly supervises them