Enhancing Peak Shaving through Nonlinear Incentive-Based Demand Response: A Consumer-Centric Utility Optimization Approach

Table 3

The LSE profit and consumers’ cost in case 1.

Model	Maximum percentage of demand reduction (%)	Decreasing the consumers’ cost compared to the base case (%)	Consumers’ cost ($)	Increasing the LSE profit compared to the base case (%)	The LSE profit ($)
Base case	—	—	5403.74	—	1937.5
Linear	7.94 at 6 pm	1.45	5325.53	1.01	1957.09
Exp	7.49 at 6 pm	1/37	5329.71	0.97	1956.39
Log	6.25 at 6 pm	1/16	5341.3	0.87	1954.28
Power	5.98 at 6 pm	1/11	5343.83	0.84	1953.8