Enhancing Peak Shaving through Nonlinear Incentive-Based Demand Response: A Consumer-Centric Utility Optimization Approach

Table 5

The LSE profit and consumers’ cost in case 2.

Model	Maximum percentage of demand reduction (%)	Decreasing the consumers’ cost compared to the base case (%)	Consumers’ cost (%)	Increasing the LSE profit compared to the base case (%)	The LSE profit ($)
Base case	—	—	5403.74	—	1937.5
Linear	15 at 3, 4, 5, and 6 pm	8.023	4970.19	20.10	2327.04
Exp	15 at 3, 4, 5, and 6 pm	8.02	4970.33	19.45	2314.38
Log	15 at 4 and 6 pm	7.77	4983.79	16.71	2261.17
Power	15 at 4 and 6 pm	7.63	4991.32	15.76	2242.82