Enhancing Peak Shaving through Nonlinear Incentive-Based Demand Response: A Consumer-Centric Utility Optimization Approach

Table 6

The LSE profit and consumers’ cost in case 3.

Model	Maximum percentage of demand reduction (%)	Decreasing the consumers’ cost compared to the base case (%)	Consumers’ cost ($)	Increasing the LSE profit compared to the base case (%)	The LSE profit ($)
Base case	—	—	5403.74	—	1937.5
Linear	30 at 4 and 6 pm	14.99	4593.98	26.10	2443.14
Exp	27.39 at 4 and 6 pm	13.59	4669.18	23.03	2383.38
Log	17.46 at 6 pm	8.88	4928.26	16.98	2266.57
Power	15.58 at 6 pm	7.88	4977.68	15.78	2243.19