Can Monetary Incentive Regulate Boarding Passenger Distribution on the Metro Station Platform?

Table 1

Variables in the utility analysis.

Variables	Explanation
x	Discounts for passengers who move from crowded areas to noncrowded areas
λ	Passengers’ choice; move-1; not move-0
θ	The probability of moved passengers to swipe the card
W	The utility of passengers who choose to move
C	The original travel fare
μ	Passenger’s perceived coefficient of discount
F	The physical energy consumption of passengers to complete the movement
d	The average comfort level reduction of passengers in crowded areas
ρ	The capacity reduction of the metro station caused by the queue length disequilibrium
	The utility of the metro passenger
	The payoff of the metro passenger
	The disturbance of the passenger’s utility
	The utility of the metro company
	The payoff of the metro company
	The disturbance of the utility of the metro company