SF-LAP: Secure M2M Communication in IIoT with a Single-Factor Lightweight Authentication Protocol

Table 2

SF-LAP VS. SLAP Protocol.

SF-LAP	SLAP
It provides a clear use-case in 3 steps	Does not provide the use-case diagram
Provides security against eavesdropping attacks	Does not provide resilience against eavesdropping attacks
Provides security against replay attacks	Does not resist replay attack
Provides security against impersonation attacks	Does not resist impersonation attack
Provides security against desynchronization attacks	Does not resist desynchronization attack
Timestamps both the and simultaneously	Does not provide this phenomenon
Communicates between and via server	There is no medium other than the sensor and controller
Provides the facility of timestamp through the server clock	Not provide the facility of this type of a timestamp
Provides pseudocode of our procedure	Does not provide any pseudocode
A special nonce function is used which provides the random number only for one time and then it never uses the same random number again in its communication	There is a simple random number is used in communication that is vulnerable for replay attack