Pricing Decisions in Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Competitive Fairness-Concerned Collectors

Table 2

Symbol description.

Parameters
M	Manufacturer
R	Retailer
Ti	Collector i, i = 1, 2
A	The potential capacity of the market
B	The sensitivity coefficient of the price
H	Quantity of used products that the collector pays no collecting cost
C	The cost of the new products produced by raw materials
Cr	The cost of remanufacture made by collecting used products
Δ	The per unit saving cost from collecting to remanufacturing,
Δ	The substitution coefficient of the competition between the collectors, and 0 < δ < 1
	The retailer’s market demand
Gi	Collection amount of the collector i,
rsc	Collecting rate of the CLSC, and , and
C	The centralized decision-making model
TY	The collectors are fairness-concerned and the manufacturer considers (passive) fairness concern of the collectors
TN	The collectors are fairness-concerned but the manufacturer does not consider fairness concern of the collectors
NN	The collectors are not fairness-concerned and the manufacturer does not consider fairness concern of the collectors
NY	The collectors are not fairness-concerned but the manufacturer considers (active) fairness concern of the collectors
Subscript sc	The CLSC decision
Superscript “”	The optimal solution of the CLSC
λ	Fairness concern coefficient of the collectors
	Fairness reference point of the collectors i
Decision variables
	Retail price set by the retailer
Ai	Recycling price set by the collector
B	Transfer price set by the manufacturer,
W	Wholesale price set by the manufacturer
Performance measures
	The profit of the manufacturer under the model l,
	The profit of the retailer under the model l,
	The profit of the collector Ti under the model l,
	The profit of the CLSC under the model l,
	The utility of the collector under the model l,