Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Innovation Behavior of High-Tech Enterprises with Government Participation

Table 1

Contribution of previous authors.

Author(s)	Government participation	Innovation behavior	Correlation	Research method
Sun et al. [10]	Taxation policy	Developed	Significant	Qualitative analysis
Jia and Ma [19]	Tax incentive	R&D expenditures	Insignificant	Qualitative analysis
Qi et al. [11]	Tax incentive	Innovation capability	Significant	Panel regression analysis
Chen and Li [13]	Tax incentive	R&D incentives	Significant	Quantitative empirical analysis
Song et al. [16]	Tax incentive	Innovation performance	Insignificant	Quantitative empirical analysis
Chen et al. [14]	Taxation policy	R&D efficiency	Significant	Quantitative empirical analysis
Kläser et al. [12]	Taxation policy	Developed	Significant	Quantitative empirical analysis
Chen and Gupta [17]	Taxation policy	R&D incentives	Insignificant	Panel regression analysis
Liu et al. [27]	Government regulation	Developed	Significant	Evolutionary game
Zhu G. et al. [29]	Environmental supervision	Developed	Significant	Evolutionary game
Álvarez et al. [15]	Public subsidies	R&D investment	Significant	Quantitative empirical analysis
This model	Government supervision	Developed	Significant	Evolutionary game