Subject Behavior of Collaborative Innovation in Civil-Military Integration: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Table 2

Det (J) and Tra (J) signs of equilibrium points of evolutionary game.

Condition 1	Condition 2	(0, 0)	(0, 1)	(1, 0)	(1, 1)
M > TA, M > TB	TA − N > μApPAB, TB − N > μBqPAB	+, +	+, −	+, −	+, +
	TA − N > μApPAB,TB − N < μBqPAB	+, +	+, −	−, ?	−, ?
	TA − N < μApPAB, TB − N > μBqPAB	+, +	−, ?	+, −	−, ?
	TA − N < μApPAB, TB − N < μBqPAB	+, +	−, ?	−, ?	+, −
M > TA, M < TB	TA − N > μApPAB, TB − N > μBqPAB	−, ?	+, +	+, −	+, +
	TA − N > μApPAB, TB − N < μBqPAB	−, ?	−, ?	−, ?	−, ?
	TA − N < μApPAB, TB − N > μBqPAB	−, ?	+, +	+, −	−, ?
	TA − N < μApPAB, TB − N < μBqPAB	−, ?	+, +	−, ?	+, −
M < TA, M > TB	TA − N > μApPAB, TB − N > μBqPAB	−, ?	+, −	−, ?	−, ?
	TA − N > μApPAB, TB − N < μBqPAB	−, ?	+, −	+, +	−, ?
	TA − N < μApPAB, TB − N > μBqPAB	−, ?	−, ?	−, ?	−, ?
	TA − N < μApPAB, TB − N < μBqPAB	−, ?	−, ?	+, +	+, −
M < TA, M < TB	TA − N > μApPAB, TB − N > μBqPAB	+, −	−, ?	−, ?	+, +
	TA − N > μApPAB, TB − N < μBqPAB	+, −	−, ?	+, +	−, ?
	TA − N < μApPAB, TB − N > μBqPAB	+, −	+, +	−, ?	−, ?
	TA − N < μApPAB, TB − N < μBqPAB	+, −	+, +	+, +	+, −