Cost-Sharing Mechanism of Water Pollution Control in Main and Subbasins Based on Stackelberg Game Model

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Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Figure 12

Figure 12: Cost-Sharing Mechanism of Water Pollution Control in Main and Subbasins Based on Stackelberg Game Model 