Research Article
Cost-Sharing Mechanism of Water Pollution Control in Main and Subbasins Based on Stackelberg Game Model
Table 2
The effect of each parameter on optimal cost-sharing ratios.
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Notes: represents pollution elimination of tributary 1 paying unit pollution control efforts; represents the social benefit brought to the region by pollution treatment efforts of the tributary 1 government; represents competitive coefficient; represents the proportion of subsidies to the main stream after the central government levies environmental protection tax; represents pollution elimination of tributary 2 paying unit pollution control efforts; represents the benefit due to pollution treatment of tributary 2 to relieve pollution control pressure of tributary 1; represents the benefit due to pollution treatment of tributary 1 to relieve pollution control pressure of tributary 2; represents the social benefit brought to the region by pollution treatment efforts of the tributary 2 government; represents environmental protection tax; represents coefficients of basin social welfare effect on main stream government benefits; represents discount rate; represents the attenuation coefficient of the reduction due to factors such as aging of wastewater treatment equipment. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||