Optimization of Benefit Allocation in Contracted Water-Saving Projects Based on the Shapley Value Method
Table 10
Cooperation situation assumption and benefit allocation.
Participants
Feature description
Distribution ratio
Benefit value (million yuan)
A
University A does not cooperate with water-saving service companies and transform water-saving equipment by itself. Due to the lack of professional knowledge, experience, and technical equipment, the water-saving effect is poor.
30%
5.868
Y
University A did not carry out water-saving transformation; there is no water-saving project.
0
0
D
University A did not carry out water-saving transformation; there is no water-saving project.
0
0
Y + A
Water-saving company Y did not introduce funds from securities company D; the funds could not meet the actual demand and the water-saving income decreased correspondingly.
80%
15.648
A + D
University A cooperates with securities company D to transform itself.
50%
9.78
Y + D
Water-saving company Y cooperates with securities company D; there is no water-saving project.
0
0
Y + A + D
Water-saving company Y, University A, and securities company D cooperate.
