RETRACTED: Violation Punishment and Total Factor Productivity, Based on the Spillover Effect between Director-Interlocked Firms
Table 7
Results of time effect of violation punishment on total factor productivity of director-interlocked firms.
t +2
t +3
TFP_OP
TFP_LP
TFP_OP
TFP_LP
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
−0.029
−0.032
−0.009
−0.023
(−1.78)
(−1.87)
(−0.47)
(−1.15)
Age
−0.878
0.161
−0.872
0.140
(−34.25)
(6.22)
(−30.43)
(4.71)
Lev
0.732
0.800
0.761
0.814
(13.77)
(14.44)
(12.84)
(12.59)
Size
0.372
0.538
0.358
0.518
(46.88)
(64.05)
(39.80)
(52.84)
State
0.105
0.073
0.085
0.055
(5.98)
(4.00)
(4.31)
(2.57)
Grow
0.084
0.079
0.030
0.027
(3.63)
(3.39)
(1.15)
(1.03)
ROE
1.184
1.705
0.961
1.474
(10.73)
(14.58)
(8.05)
(11.43)
Independ
−0.076
−0.025
−0.026
0.099
(−0.55)
(−0.17)
(−0.16)
(0.57)
Dual
0.007
0.018
0.004
0.015
(0.35)
(0.90)
(0.16)
(0.62)
Constant
0.570
−2.395
0.948
−1.465
(2.08)
(−8.63)
(3.90)
(−5.09)
Ind/Year
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adj_R2
0.598
0.705
0.572
0.671
F
163.053
281.972
143.055
211.304
N
6023
6023
5102
5102
Note. ,, and indicate that the variables pass the test at the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are t values, which are all two tailed.
