RETRACTED: Violation Punishment and Total Factor Productivity, Based on the Spillover Effect between Director-Interlocked Firms
Table 8
Mediating effect test of violation punishment on total factor productivity of interlocked firms: R&D investment.
R&D
TFP_OPt+1
TFP_LPt+1
(1)
(2)
(3)
−0.340
−0.032
−0.026
(−2.50)
(−2.21)
(−1.79)
R&D
0.002
0.004
(1.38)
(3.35)
Age
−0.865
0.197
(−37.82)
(8.85)
Lev
0.714
0.792
(15.18)
(16.72)
State
0.111
0.081
(7.10)
(5.13)
ROE
1.480
1.965
(14.76)
(19.05)
Independ
0.012
0.016
(0.10)
(0.13)
Dual
−0.009
−0.006
(−0.52)
(−0.39)
Size
0.470
0.380
0.551
(8.10)
(54.86)
(77.73)
Grow
0.320
0.126
0.100
(1.61)
(5.81)
(4.74)
Cash
3.357
(5.52)
TA
−7.655
(−10.70)
CFO
4.361
(4.07)
Constant
−12.522
0.468
−2.708
(−5.62)
(2.20)
(−13.21)
Ind/Year
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adj_R2
0.600
0.624
0.740
F
349.048
205.571
387.281
N
8805
7202
7202
Note. ,, and indicate that the variables pass the test at the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are t values, which are all two tailed.
